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ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to provide empirical evidence of the efficacy of board characteristics in 
constraining management opportunism, measured by real earnings management. The paper uses 
regression analysis to document empirical evidence regarding the impact of the independence of 
boards of directors and the independence of committees on real earnings management in 7,481 
US firms over the period 2000 to 2009. This study contributes to empirical studies on the role of 
corporate governance in financial reporting quality by demonstrating the role of the independence 
of boards of directors and the independence of committees in constraining real earnings 
management. These results should contribute to providing an orientation for future regulators 
regarding possible amendments, especially in the wake of the current financial crisis.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 number of financial scandals occurred around the world towards the end of 2000 (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom and Tyco International), and, with the advent of successive financial crises (tech bubble, 
subprime), the global economic landscape has changed dramatically. All these circumstances have 
cast doubt on the quality of the financial information published by companies and have revived debates that 
academics, experts and legislators believed had already been solved, debates about the integrity of accounting 
information and the role of governance. The enactments of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX), described by some 
specialists to be too restrictive (Demski, 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005), may restore investor confidence and 
improve the quality of accounting information. 
 
Prior accounting literature identifies two alternative ways to manage earnings: accruals and real activities 
(Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). Accruals manipulation has been extensively studied in 
previous work, while real earnings management has remained a largely unexplored area.  
 
In a theoretical work using a rational expectations model, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) demonstrate that 
when firms are subject to a tightening regulation to improve their earnings quality may actually lead managers to 
switch to other manipulation tools like real earnings management. Empirical studies validate these theoretical 
predictions. Cohen et al. (2008) examine the level of earnings management for two periods: pre and post SOX 
enactment. They confirm that the level of accruals manipulation declined after the passage of SOX, while real 
activities manipulation increased for the same period. Their results suggest that SOX, as a restrictive law, motives 
managers to switch from accounting to real activities manipulations because the later are considered to be 
distinguishable and constrained. Roychowdhury (2006), Zang (2012) and Chan et al. (2014) also show that 
managers prefer using the real activities manipulations when their accounting flexibility is reduced by a tighter 
scrutiny.  
A 
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Certainly an increase in earnings, will lead to a higher valuation of the firm and consequently will increase 
the value of manger' stock-based option compensation (Chan et al., 2014). Consequently, it will also mislead the 
different stakeholders which are concerned by firm performance (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
 
In fact, various control mechanisms could limit the opportunistic behaviour of managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). From a financial perspective, the board of directors, as a statutory authority responsible for 
controlling and ratifying management decisions, plays an important role in the resolution of agency conflicts (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). It is considered as an internal corporate governance mechanism whose efficiency has a direct 
impact on value creation and, consequently, on shareholder satisfaction.  
 
The tendency of manipulating real activities to manage earnings is a challenge to corporate governance 
practices, so it is interesting to verify the impact of board of director and audit committee characteristics on real 
earnings management.  
 
This study examines the role of characteristics of the board of directors, including board size, independence 
and committee composition, on the pattern of real earnings management in corporate governance. It seeks to identify 
the role of characteristics of the board of directors in constraining manager opportunism, especially in the case of 
real earnings management.  
 
We focus our empirical analysis on a sample of 7,481 US firms listed on AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ 
over the period 2000 to 2009. We first estimate real earnings management (REM) (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et 
al., 2008; Chi et al., 2011). Following Roychowdhury (2006), we use operating activities manipulation. This 
includes abnormal cash flow, abnormal production and abnormal discretionary expenses. We then examine whether 
characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee affect real earnings management in terms of (1) 
board independence, (2) audit committee independence, (3) nominating committee independence, (4) governance 
committee independence and (5) remuneration committee independence.   
 
Our empirical findings are as follows. Only the boards of directors’ characteristics have a significant effect 
on real earnings management. The number of directors is positively associated with higher levels of real earnings 
management. We also find that the board’s independence is associated with lower levels of real earnings 
management. Adopting completely independent board committees does not have an effect on the level of real 
earnings management.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, this study adds to the prior literature on 
the relation between corporate governance and financial reporting quality. Past literature has concentrated on 
accruals earnings management and, on the whole, research has not focused on real earnings management. Second, 
this paper presents evidence that increasing the number of independent members on a board leads to decreasing the 
level of real earnings management. At the same time, totally independent committees do not affect the level of real 
earnings management. This result supports the idea that stock exchange requirements were motivated more by 
subjective than by empirical evidence. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical background and 
prior studies. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data collection and research methods. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the study.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Real Earnings Management 
 
To mislead some stakeholders regarding underlying economic performance, managers can manipulate 
earnings by exercising discretion over accounting or by engaging in real activities manipulation. The review of prior 
literature focuses on accruals earnings manipulation and divides the motivations for earnings management into two 
classes: those related to contractual constraints mentioned by the positive political theory of accounting and those 
related to financial market pressures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Healy and Walhen, 1999). Recent papers 
suggest that directors manipulate earnings by the manipulation of real activities for the same objectives as in the 
case of accrual manipulation, to increase valuations, to avoid negative contracting consequences (e.g., violation of 
debt covenants) and to avoid negative regulatory consequences (Graham et al., 2005).  
 
Roychowdhury (2006) suggests that managers manipulate real activities in order to avoid missing earnings 
targets. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), in an analytical study, show that, when accounting flexibility is reduced by 
tightened accounting regulation, firms resort to real earnings manipulation. Cohen et al. (2008) validate empirically 
that, for the period after SOX, firms manipulate their earnings less by accruals and more by engaging in real 
activities manipulation to avoid violation of any laws or regulations. Recently, Kuo et al. (2014) find that Chinese 
firms, after “split share structure reform” have shifted from manipulating earnings via accruals to real earnings 
management because it is less detectable and under-scrutinized. Moreover, Kim et al. (2010) report that firms 
manipulate earnings by real activities especially when they are near the violation of debt covenants Ge et Kim 
(2014) report that firms engage in real earnings management in the year of issuing their new bond, in order to 
mislead rating agencies and consequently to have a lower bond yield spread. 
 
However, managing real activities is more costly to firms and their stakeholders (Gunny, 2005; 2010) but is 
less costly to managers. In fact, when accounting information is correctly disclosed in financial statements, it is less 
likely to draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny (Cohen et al., 2008). Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) and Chan et al. (2014) find that real earnings management imposes potentially great long-term 
costs on shareholders compared to accruals manipulation, this is due to his negative effects on future cash flows and 
could hurt the viability of the firm.  
 
Board Characteristics And Real Earnings Management 
 
Prior research has examined the role of board characteristics on real earnings management. The results to 
date are mixed.   
 
Visvanathan (2008) examined the attributes of the board of directors (size, independence and duality) and 
the attributes of audit committees (size, independence and frequency of meetings) and their effects on real earnings 
management (cash flow, discretionary spending and production) using a sample of 6.759 observations over the 
period from 1996 to 2002. The author found limited support for assumptions about the disciplinary power exercised 
by these governance mechanisms on real earnings management and demonstrated their effectiveness in the case of 
accounting manipulation. The results show that only the independence of the board, measured by the proportion of 
independent directors, has a negative and significant effect on abnormal production. The author justifies the lack of 
relationship between governance mechanisms and management of real activities by pointing out that this technique 
is not an offense that external auditors will focus on. Second, real earnings management has not been adequately 
dealt with by empirical studies, and, therefore, there is a lack of work on detection. Adding to this is the fact that real 
activities manipulation is more complex and that, therefore, the establishment of methods for its detection is a 
difficult task. Finally, the author questions such actions, even if different management techniques produce real 
results as pointed out by Roychowdhury (2006), because they can generate misidentification. 
 
The study of Osma (2008) is based on a sample of 3,438 firms. This sample consists of all firms in the UK 
non-financial spread across 29 different industries. The purpose of the study is to determine the role played by an 
independent board of directors in mitigating real earnings management, especially in terms of the manipulation of 
research and development expenses. For this, it uses a logistic model. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
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that takes the value of 1 or 0 reflecting whether a company in question has decreased the amount invested in 
research and development or not. Different from Visvanathan’s (2008) study and the belief in the opacity of his 
technique, the author demonstrates empirically that an independent board is capable to detect and limit real activities 
manipulation. The author also found that the dominance of outsiders on the board is likely to encourage managers to 
focus on the short term in the sense that a friendly board hampers management discipline. 
 
Carcello et al. (2008) find that there is no relationship between production manipulation and the presence of 
an expert in the audit committee. However, there is a positive and significant relationship between the manipulation 
of discretionary expenses and the presence of an expert among the members of the audit committee for firms that 
have a low quality of governance. In contrast, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) find, for a sample of firms after 
SOX, that the presence of an expert in the audit committee can mitigate real earnings management. 
 
Garven (2009) tests the impact of the characteristics of the board and audit committee on managing 
discretionary expenses. The author identified firms that engaged in these activities to avoid losses publication as a 
threshold. The study covered the post-SOX period from 2005 to 2007 for a sample of US companies listed on 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (S&P 1500). The results showed that the possession of a company’s shares by the 
independent members of a board of directors helped to align the interests of the board with shareholders. In addition, 
an excessive number of members serving on audit committee and board hinder the effectiveness of these two bodies. 
Garven (2009) showed that the board plays a limited role and the audit committee has no power over the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers in the case of real earnings management. According to the author, these results 
were mainly due to the lack of media coverage of practices like accounting manipulation and also to confusion 
between current manipulation and manipulation aimed to inflate short-term business results. In the same sense, Su et 
al. (2014) show that high additional members in audit committees worsen their monitoring effectiveness in 
constraining real earnings management.   
 
Kang and Kim (2012) examine the impact of corporate governance on real earnings management, including 
the characteristics of the board of directors in the Korean context. The authors find that the relationship between real 
earnings management and board independence and board size is negative. The presence of an audit committee does 
not influence the level of real earnings management. They also develop an index of governance and verify 
endogeneity between real earnings management and the quality of governance. Thus, for companies making losses, 
the quality of governance does not affect the manipulation of real activities. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Description  
 
The main purpose of this study is to identify the impact of board characteristics on real earnings 
management. To achieve this, we collected a sample panel composed of companies listed on NASDAQ, AMEX and 
NYSE for the period 2000 to 2009. Financial data is collected from Compustat database, Board characteristics from 
RiskMetrics database and to calculate BONUS we used ExecuComp database. 
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Table 1. Distribution of sample by year and industry 
Panel A: Distribution of sample by year 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Total 287 577 663 685 714 764 858 981 990 962 7481 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample by industry 
Industry  Total 
Manufacturing 4684 
Retail trade 779 
Services 1354 
Wholesale trade 297 
Mining 367 
Total 7481 
 
To form a homogeneous sample, we excluded financial firms (SIC codes: 6000–6999) and regulated firms 
(SIC codes: 4400–5000) insofar as they obey the rules well regarding the presentation of financial statements. We 
eliminated from our main sample observations missing data for the calculation of real earnings management and 
control variables. Negative sales or sales equal to zero and observations whose total assets were equal to zero were 
excluded. We also excluded all observations with firm-year sectors (according to the first two SIC codes) with less 
than 15 observations in a given year.  
 
Our sample is composed of 7,481 observations. We find that 157 firms had incentives to manage earnings 
upward, i.e., firms that aimed to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (zero earnings, previous year’s earnings).  
 
Empirical Models 
 
Measure Of Real Earnings Management:  
 
In this study, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008) in defining our three proxies of real 
earnings management (sales manipulation, discretionary expenses and overproduction). As in these two papers, 
abnormally low levels of cash flow and discretionary expenses and high levels of production costs are considered as 
indicators of upward real activities manipulation.   
 
(1) Sales Manipulation Or Abnormal Operating Cash Flow 
 
According to Roychowdhury (2006), handling sales is a technique that aims to increase the volume of sales 
for the current period, following the introduction of discounts and favourable payment terms. This technique helps 
to reduce the receipts of a company. Therefore, it greatly reduces the level of operating cash flow.  
 
An abnormal level of cash flow from operations (Ab_CFO) is the difference between the actual cash flow 
from operations and the cash flow’s normal operation. This model is estimated for each year t from 2000 to 2009 
and for each sector (identified by the first two SIC codes) with at least 15 observations (first two SIC codes-year) 
using the following regression model: 
 
      
       
    
 
       
   
        
       
     
          
       
                       
Where 
 
CFO: operating cash flow, 
AT: total assets and 
Sales: net sales. 
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(2) Overproduction 
 
Managers of industrial enterprises, which have a low sensitivity of demand with respect to price, may use 
overproduction to manage their results. The principle of this technique is to produce more than the normal amount. 
Then, general fixed costs are spread over a large number of units, and, in this case, the fixed costs of production will 
be absorbed and reduce the fixed cost per unit. Therefore, the cost of goods sold will decrease automatically 
generating a greater operating margin (Roychowdhury, 2006). However, such a company will incur additional costs 
of production and relative storage costs generated by the additional production not sold. Therefore, the operating 
cash flow will be lower than the normal level in relation to sales. All things being equal, the marginal cost of 
production and additional storage will result in increased production costs compared to annual sales. 
 
The abnormal level of production (Ab_PROD) is estimated for each year t from 2000 to 2009 and for each 
sector (identified by the first two SIC codes) with at least 15 observations (first two SIC codes-year) by the 
following regression model: 
 
       
       
    
 
       
   
        
       
   
         
       
   
           
       
                   
 
Where 
 
                           
 
PROD: production costs equal to the cost of goods sold (COGS) and inventory variation (Δ INVT),  
AT: total assets and  
Sales: net sales 
 
(3) Manipulation Of Discretionary Expenses 
 
Discretionary expenses are paid in the same period they are incurred. To meet its short-term objectives of 
increasing its profit for the current year, a company can reduce discretionary spending by the reducing expenditures 
reported. Indeed, these expenses do not generate immediate revenue; they are in the form of cash, and, therefore, 
reducing such spending reduces cash outflows, increasing the cash flow from operations for the current period 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). 
 
An abnormal level of discretionary spending (Ab_DISC) is estimated for each year t from 2000 to 2009 and 
for each sector (identified by the first two SIC codes) with at least 15 observations (first two SIC codes-year) by the 
following regression model: 
 
       
       
    
 
       
    
          
       
                                                                   
 
Where 
 
                                                                  
 
DISC: discretionary expenses, 
AT: total assets and 
Sales: net sales. 
 
(4) Total Real Earnings Management 
 
We establish a global measurement of real earnings management. Residual values of models (A) and (C) 
are multiplied by (-1) because, when handling sales and/or discretionary expenses, actual operating cash flows and 
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actual discretionary expenses are less than operating cash flows and discretionary expenses estimated. To bring 
changes in various processes into a single unit (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011), this 
measure is the sum of all the operations of the three standardized residuals. The larger this measure, the greater the 
degree of manipulation of the real activities of a company. We calculate real earnings management by the following 
regression: 
 
                                                                                         (D) 
 
Where 
 
REM: real earnings management, 
Ab_CFO: abnormal level of operating cash flow (the residual of model A), 
Ab_PROD: abnormal level of production (the residual of model B) and, 
Ab_DISC: abnormal level of discretionary expenses (the residual of model C). 
 
Model Of The Impact Of Board Characteristics On Real Earnings Management 
 
                                                                               
 
Where 
 
REM: the composite measure of all standardized real activities manipulation and 
BC: board characteristic. 
 
Board Of Directors 
 
The board of directors is considered as a vital organ of internal corporate governance. In this study, we 
consider two features of the board of directors: board size (NDIR) and independence (BOARD_IND). Two main 
functions are assigned to the board of directors, namely, the evaluation and ratification of decisions and control 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Through its functions, the board protects the interests of shareholders and 
helps managers to undertake strategies and appropriate decisions. 
 
NDIR: the size of the board. The size of the board has been subject to various criticisms, which relate to the search 
for an optimal size. Proponents of agency theory hold that the more the optimal size of the board is reduced the 
easier will be internal communication and decision making (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996). For followers of the theory of resource dependence, they prefer large board. Indeed, the presence 
of a large number of directors, each with specific knowledge, favours favourable transactions between firms (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992). 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The Relation Between Board Size And Real Earnings Management Is Positive. 
 
BORD_IND: the independence of the board. This is the number of independent directors divided by board size. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the structure of a board is a key element of its effectiveness. According to 
agency theory, the presence of independent directors can mitigate agency conflicts and thus the managerial 
opprtunism. These directors are forced to improve their reputations in the labour market (Fama, 1980). However, 
some studies question the effectiveness of boards dominated by outside members. Indeed, outside directors have less 
information than internal members. The special character of the real earnings management technique requires a 
detailed knowledge of the internal operations of a company. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The relation between board independence and real earnings management is negative. 
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Board Committees 
 
AUD_IND: a binary variable that takes 1 if the members of an audit committee are independent and 0 otherwise. 
The primary role of an audit committee is to ensure reliable financial and accounting information and to follow this 
through the development of financial reporting and the monitoring of the effectiveness of internal control systems. 
Klein (2002) finds that the relationship between the independence of the audit committee and the management of 
discretionary accruals is negative and significant.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The relation between audit committee independence and real earnings management is negative. 
 
NOM_IND: a binary variable that takes 1 if the members of a nominating committee (or selection) of the directors 
are independent and 0 otherwise. The committee’s role is proposing candidates for the board of directors and various 
committees. It is the most vital organ that ensures the independence of the board and all committees. Kouki et al. 
(2011) suggest that the independence of the nominating committee reduces earnings management. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: The relation between nominating committee independence and real earnings management is 
negative. 
 
COMP_IND: a binary variable that takes 1 if the members of a compensation committee are independent and 0 
otherwise. The principal role of the compensation committee is to make recommendations to the board of directors 
on the remuneration policy for directors and on incentive policies. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The relation between compensation committee independence and real earnings management is 
negative. 
 
GOV_IND: a binary variable that takes 1 if the members of a governance committee are independent and 0 
otherwise. This committee is responsible for the annual evaluation of the board and various committees. It also 
assists the board in carrying out annual reviews of the quality and supervision of business conduct and of adequate 
disclosure of information. Huang et al. (2009) find that firms that are able to resolve severe agency problems have 
governance committees. In addition, they find that totally independent governance committees do not have an effect 
on earnings management.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: The relation between governance committee independence and real earnings management is 
negative. 
 
SUSPECT: an indicative variable that takes 1 if a firm has strong incentives to manage earnings upward, i.e., a firm 
that meets or just beats one of two earnings benchmarks (zero earnings, previous year’s earnings)1. 
TAIL: the natural log of total assets. 
LEV: the leveraged ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
MB: the market to book ratio. 
ROA: the return on assets ratio, the ratio of earnings before ordinary items to total assets at the end of a period. 
BON: average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by a CEO. 
 
  
                                                 
1 As Roychowdhury (2006), we define firms that meet or beat zero earnings benchmarks if their net income scaled by total assets at the beginning 
of a year falls into the interval [0, 0.005] and firms that meet or beat a previous year’s earnings benchmarks if their change in net income scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the year falls into the interval between [0, 0.005]. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Univariate Results 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. Panel A in Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for estimated 
coefficients and adjusted R
2
 of real earnings management models (Abn_CFO, Abn_Prod and Abn_Discexp). Models 
A, B and C were estimated by industry (two digit-SIC code) and year; firms with fewer than 15 observations were 
eliminated from the sample. There are 531 such industry-year groups from 2000 to 2009. The sign of our estimated 
coefficients are similar to those reported in seminal Roychowdhury’s (2006) study on real earnings management. 
Respectively the Mean of adjusted R
2  
for Ab_CFO, Ab_PROD and Ab_DISC are about 70.37 %, 95.69 % and 
79.06 %. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for estimated coefficients and adjusted R2 of real earnings management models  
Distribution of estimated coefficients and R2s from Model (A) to calculate Ab_CFO 
 CFO/ATi,t-1 
 Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3 
1/ATi,t-1 
-1.7514 
(-1.31) 
17.7937 -10.3513 -1.6203 6.9916 
Salesi,t/ATi,t-1 
0.0949 
(23.24)*** 
0.0543 0.0649 0.0904 0.1154 
ΔSalesi,t/ATi,t-1 
0.0824 
(7.21)*** 
0.1520 -0.0204 0.0718 0.1812 
Adjusted R2  0.7037 0.1645 0.6109 0.7378 0.8236 
 
Distribution of estimated coefficients and R2s from Model (A) to calculate Ab_PROD 
 PROD/ATi,t-1 
 Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3 
1/ATi,t-1 
-21.0285 
(-4.42)*** 
63.3169 -28.9523 -12.1835 2.3404 
Salesi,t/ATi,t-1 
0.6961   
(90.65)*** 
0.1021 0.6480 0.7052 0.7518 
ΔSalesi,t/ATi,t-1 
0.0450 
(1.58) 
0.3802 -0.1556 0.0478 0.2220 
ΔSalesi,t-1/ATi,t-1 
-0.0494 
(-1.74)* 
0.3779 0.2262 -0.0502 0.0783 
Adjusted R2  0.9569 0.0388 0.9414 0.9728 0.9850 
 
Distribution of estimated coefficients and R2s from Model (A) to calculate Ab_DISC 
 DISC/ATi,t-1 
 Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3 
1/ATi,t-1 
28.0794 
(8.00)*** 
46.6977 5.1375 19.3809 31.3806 
Salesi,t-1/ATi,t-1 
0.1853                    
(28.20)*** 
0.0874 0.1229 0.1753 0.2373 
Adjusted R2  
 
0.7906 0.1053 0.7475 0.8036 0.8607 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of binary variables 
 Mean Std. dev Min Max 
AUD_IND 0,8990 0,3013 0 1 
COMP_IND 0,8900 0,3128 0 1 
NOM_IND 0,8149 0,3883 0 1 
GOV_IND 0,8097 0,3925 0 1 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3 
REM 0.0079 2.2255 -1.3440 0.0547 1.2684 
Ab_CFO 0.0146 0.0851 -0.0352 0.0126 0.0652 
Ab_PROD -0.0300 0.1756 -0.1337 -0.0310 0.0673 
Ab_DISC 0.0186 0.1423 -0.0598 0.0125 0.0945 
NDIR 8.8201 2.2338 7 9 10 
BOARD_IND 0.7243 0.1488 0.6250 0.7500 0.8461 
TAIL 7.2288 1.4538 6.1637 7.0753 8.1549 
LEV 0.1591 0.1515 0.0022 0.1360 0.2605 
MB 2.9917 2.3911 1.5363 2.3299 3.6641 
ROA 0.0461 0.0974 0.0208 0.0573 0.0958 
BON 0.1104 0.1494 0 0.0206 0.1904 
All continuous variables are winsorisées 2%. 
 
Panels B and C in Table 2 provide descriptive statistics of binary and continuous variables of our model. 
The mean of REM is 0.0079. The variable size is volatile with a standard deviation of 1.4538 and a mean of 7.2288. 
The financial leverage ratio has a mean (median) of 15.91% (15.15%). The average profitability of the assets of 
firms in our sample is positive (4.61%), which means that, on average, these companies are profitable. Variable 
market to book (MB), which measures growth opportunities, is volatile around its standard deviation (mean), which 
is 2.3911 (2.9917). The mean (median) of variable BON is 0.1104 (0.1494). On average, the managers of our sample 
receive 11% incentive compensation relative to their total compensation, which is important. This partly explains 
their behaviour as ‘opportunistic’. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
The estimation results are provided in Table 3. All t-statistics are calculated using two-way clusters (by 
industry and year) to take into consideration heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Petersen, 2009) In the first 
three columns reports each of the three components (Ab_CFO, Ab_PROD and Ab_DISC) of the composite of real 
earnings management measure (REM), separately, as dependent variables. While the last column reports the results 
of the impact of board of directors on overall real activities manipulations (REM). 
 
We find a positive and significant coefficient of 0.67 (t=3.77) on NDIR in the REM regression. Consistent 
with the component of REM, all coefficients are also positive and significant and are about 0.56 (t=2.86), 0.09 
(t=3.45) and 0.4 (t=3.97) respectively for NDIR in Ab_CFO, Ab_DISC and Ab_PROD regressions. These results 
corroborate with the agency theory point of view, suggesting that a small board composition contribute to increase 
his monitoring effectiveness (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). In fact, the followers of this theory sustain the idea that 
large size of the board may create difficulties in communication and coordination between different directors, which 
make the process making decision heavy and less effective. Thus, a large board allows favoring the dominance of 
the executive in place, which involves coalitions and conflicts of interest between the different directors. Therefore, 
the board will be fragmented and inefficient. These results seem to be in disagreement with the others empirical 
works. For example, Visvanathan (2008) and Graven (2009) don’t detect association between board size and real 
earnings management, while Kang and Kim (2012) find a negative one.  
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Table 3. Impact of board of director characteristics on real earnings management 
Variables Ab_CFO Ab_DISC Ab_PROD REM 
Intercept 
1.34 
(5.54)*** 
1.23 
(4.81)*** 
1.14 
(4.82)*** 
1.16 
(5.51)*** 
NDIR * SUSPECT 
0.56 
(2.68)*** 
0.09 
(3.45)*** 
0.4 
(3.97)*** 
0.67 
(3.77)*** 
BOARD_IND * 
SUSPECT 
-0.47 
(-2.26)** 
-0.01 
(-4.78)** 
0.76 
(4.62)** 
-0.56 
(-3.66)** 
AUDIT_IND * 
SUSPECT 
-0.02 
(-0.12) 
-0.19 
(-0.50) 
-0.32 
(-0.01) 
-0.43 
(-0.01) 
COMP_IND * 
SUSPECT 
-0.06 
(-0.71) 
-0.01 
(-0.63) 
-0.43 
(-0.82) 
-0.28 
(-0.56) 
NOM_IND * 
SUSPECT 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.29) 
0.19 
(0.72) 
0.83 
(0.70) 
GOV_IND * 
SUSPECT 
0.02 
(0.16) 
0.34 
(0.71) 
0.74 
(0.59) 
0.46 
(0.13) 
TAIL 
-0.12 
(-4.07)*** 
-0.10 
(-4.00)*** 
-0.13 
(-4.01)*** 
-0.09 
(-3.89)*** 
LEV 
1.43 
(5.93)*** 
1.48 
(6.01)*** 
1.62 
(6.10)*** 
1.49 
(6.06)*** 
MB 
-0.24 
(-16.07) 
-0.29 
(-15.90)*** 
-0.26 
(-16.93)*** 
-0.23 
(-15.64)*** 
ROA 
-3.40 
(-6.98)*** 
-3.32 
(-6.79)*** 
-3.35 
(-6.38)*** 
-3.31 
(-6.79)*** 
BON 
0.14 
(0.61) 
0.19 
(0.87) 
0.20 
(0.80) 
0.18 
(0.83) 
Adjusted R2  0.23 0.25 0.21 0.27 
Fisher 57.82*** 60.00*** 53.98*** 71.98*** 
***, ** and *, indicate significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%. All t-statistics are calculated using two way 
clusters (industry and year) to take in consideration for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Petersen 2009). 
 
Furthermore, we find a negative and significant coefficient of -0.56 (t=-3.66) on BOARD_IND in the REM 
regression. Consistent with the component of REM all coefficients are significant and mixed. We find a negative 
coefficient of -0.47 (t=-2.26), a negative coefficient of -0.01 (t=-4.78) and a positive coefficient of 0.76 (t= 4.62) on 
BOARD_IND in Ab_CFO, Ab_DISC and Ab_PROD regressions. These results suggest that higher board 
independence is associated with lower level of real activities manipulation. Consistent with the components of the 
proxy of real earnings management, we find that board independence is associated with lower abnormal cash flow, 
lower discretionary expenses and higher abnormal production. Jointly, these results suggest that higher board 
independence is associated with a lower level of real earnings management. This result is consistent with the 
findings of some previous empirical studies (Visvanathan, 2008; Kang and Kim, 2012). Thus, the higher presence of 
independent directors in the board could constrain the managerial opportunistic behavioral and enhances the role of 
board control effectiveness. 
 
We find also that coefficients of the independence of different board committees (AUD_IND, COMP_IND, 
NOM_IND and GOV_IND) on the overall real earnings management proxy (REM) and on all its components 
(Ab_CFO, Ab_DISC, Ab_PROD) are insignificant at the conventional levels. These results imply that the 
committees are inefficient to detect and so to constrain real activities manipulations. These findings are consistent 
with the major empirical studies that have addressed the relationship between the independence of the committees of 
the board and the level of real earnings management (Carcello et al., 2008; Graven, 2009; Huang et al., 2009; Kang 
and Kim, 2012; Su et al., 2014). This is consistent with the evidence that real activities manipulations are very 
specific to be detected because it occurrence over the year, contrary to the accruals manipulation that arises at the 
end of the year. It cannot be distinguishable from current ordinary operations. In table 3, for the control variables we 
show that the variable real earnings management (REM) is positively and significantly associated with the size of 
the firm (SIZE), market to book (MB) and return on assets (ROA), while it is positively and significantly associated 
with leverage (LEV) and bonus (BON).  
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2015 Volume 31, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 672 The Clute Institute 
Finally, in the case of our sample (SOX) the independence of the board and committees is required by law. 
Our results clearly demonstrate that directors can comply with the law by increasing the number of independent 
members of the board that are, at the same time, close to management. We can, therefore, conclude that the 
structures imposed by the laws have lead officers to engage in inefficient control structures. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this article is to verify the impact of the independence of the board and committees on real 
earnings management. In this research, we are motivated by the assumption that good corporate governance leads to 
increased manager opportunism. Our empirical results show that only an independent board of directors can mitigate 
the level of real earnings management. In addition, the relation between the size of the board and real earnings 
management is positive, while completely independent board committees have no effect on the level of real earnings 
management. These results suggest that, when a board of directors is sufficiently independent, the need to establish 
independent committees might be unnecessary. 
 
Our study contributes to empirical studies concerned with the role of corporate governance in financial 
reporting quality by demonstrating the role of the independence of both the board of directors and committees in 
constraining real earnings management. This study should contribute to providing an orientation for future 
regulators regarding possible amendments, especially in the wake of the current financial crisis, and a way to revise 
laws that have been previously introduced. 
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